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Chapter 7 
Human Rights International NGOs 
A Critical Evaluation 
Makau Mutua 

The human rights movement can be seen in variety of guises. It can be seen as a move­
ment for international justice or as a cultural project for "civilizing savage" cultures. In 
this chapter, I discuss a part of that movement as a crusade for a political project. Inter­
national nongovernmental human rights organizations (INGOs), the small and elite 
collection of human rights groups based in the most powerful cultural and political 
capitals of the West, have arguably been the most influential component of the human 
rights movement. They have led the promotion and "universalization" of human rights 
norms, even though the formal creation and promotion of human rights law is carried 
out by collections of states-the so-called international community-acting in concert 
and separately within and outside the ambit of the United Nations. Indeed, INGOs have 
been the human rights movement's prime engine of growth. INGOs seek to enforce the 
application of human rights norms internationally, particularly toward repressive states 
in the South, in areas formerly colonized by the West. In this chapter, I call INGOs 
conventional doctrinalists because they are marked by a heavy and almost exclusive 
reliance on positive law in treaties and other sources of international law. 
INGOs are ideological analogues, both in theory and in method, of the traditional 
civil rights organizations that preceded them in the West. The American Civil Liber­
ties Union (ACLU), one of the most influential civil rights organizations in the United 
States, is a classic example of a Western civil rights organization.1 Two other equally 
important domestic civil rights organizations in the United States are the National As­
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 2 and the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund (LDF). 3 Although these organizations are called civil 
rights groups by Americans, they are in reality human rights organizations. The histori­
cal origin of the distinction between a "civil rights" group and a "human rights" group 
in the United States remains unclear. The primary difference is that Western human 
rights groups focus on abusive practices and traditions in what they see as relatively 
repressive, "backward" foreign countries and cultures, while the agenda of civil rights 
groups concentrates on domestic issues. Thus, although groups such as Human Rights 
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Watch publish reports on human rights abuses in the United States, the focus of their 
activity is the human rights problems or abuses of other countries. 
The half-dozen leading human rights organizations, the prototypical conventional 
doctrinalists, have arisen in the West over the last half century with the express intent of 
promoting certain basic Western liberal values-now dubbed human rights-through­
out the world, especially the non-Western world. These INGOs were the brainchildren 
of prominent Western civil rights advocates, lawyers, and private citizens. 
The International League for the Rights of Man, now the International League for 
Human Rights (ILHR), is the oldest such organization, founded in New York in 1942.4 
At various times it has focused on victims of torture, religious intolerance, the rights of 
human rights monitors at its affiliates abroad, the reunification of Eastern Europeans 
with relatives in the West during the Cold War, and the human rights treaty state re­
porting system within the United Nations, and it even got interested in anticolonial 
struggles in Mrica and Asia. 5 Roger Baldwin, the founder of the ACLU, also founded 
the ILHR. 6 The ILHR itself was responsible for establishing in New York the Lawyers 
Committee for International Human Rights, now known as the Lawy ers Committee _ 
for Human Rights (LCHR), another of the more important Western INGOs, in 1975. 
The LCHR claims to promote the human rights standards contained in the Interna­
tional Bill of Rights. 7 The New York-based Human Rights Watch, discussed in earlier 
chapters, has developed into the most dominant American INGO working to expose 
violations of basic liberal freedoms. The last major American INGO is the Washington 
D.C. -based International Human Rights Law Group, which was established by the Pro­
cedural Aspects of International Law Institute, a private American organization that 
explores issues in international law. 8 Some American domestic civil rights NGOs are 
acutely aware of their pioneering role in the creation of similar organizations abroad. 9 
Until recently, and to a large extent even today, none of these American INGOs focused 
on human rights issues in the United States, except to seek the reform of U.S. foreign 
policy and American compliance with aspects of refugee law. 10 
The two other leading INGOs are located in Europe, in the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland. The Geneva-based International Commission of jurists (ICJ) was "founded 
in 1952 to promote the 'rule of law' 11 throughout the world." 12 The ICJ has been accused 
of being a tool of the West in the Cold War, spending considerable resources expos­
ing the failures of Soviet bloc and one-party states.13 Today, however, it is regarded as 
a bona fide INGO, concerned with rule of law questions in the South and other issues, 
as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Lastly, the London-based Amnesty International (AI), the most powerful human 
rights INGO, is today synonymous with the human rights movement and has inspired 
the creation of many similar human rights groups around the world. It was launched 
by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer, writing in the May 28, 1961, issues of the Observer 
and Le Monde. Benenson's article, "Forgotten Prisoners, " urged moral outrage and ap­
peals for amnesty for individuals who were imprisoned, tortured, or executed because 
of their political opinions or religion.14 The recipient of the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize, 
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AI claims that its object is "to contribute to the observance throughout the world of 
human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" through cam­
paigns to free prisoners of conscience; to ensure fair trials within a reasonable time for 
political prisoners; to abolish the death penalty, torture, and other cruel treatment of 
prisoners; and to end extrajudicial executions and disappearances. In the last few years, 
AI has done substantial work in the West, including exposes of police brutality and the 
application of the death penalty in the United States. 
Social Support and Political Bias 
Some structural factors provide evidence of the ideological orientation of INGOs. They 
concern the sources of their moral, financial, and social support. The founding fathers 
of major INGOs-they have all been white males-were Westerners who either worked 
on or had an interest in domestic civil and political rights issues; they sought the reform 
of governmental laws, policies, and processes to bring about compliance with Ameri­
can and European conceptions of liberal democracy and equal protection. Although 
the founders of the INGOs did not explicitly state their "mission" as a crusade for the 
globalization of these values, they nevertheless crafted organizational mandates that 
promoted liberal ideals and norms. In any case, the key international human rights 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Inter­
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) pierced the sovereign veil for 
the purposes of protecting and promoting human rights. The mandates of INGOs are 
lifted, almost verbatim, from such instruments. AI also deploys jurisprudential argu­
ments developed in the context of Western liberal democracy to cast the death penalty 
as the "ultimate form of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment." 15 
The pool for the social support of INGOs has therefore come from the private, 
nongovernmental, and civil society segments of the industrial democracies: prominent 
lawyers, academics at leading universities, the business and entertainment elite, and 
other professionals. In the United States, these circles are drawn from the liberal estab­
lishment; the overwhelming majority vote for and support the Democratic Party and 
its politics and are opposed to the Republican Party. The board of directors of Human 
Rights Watch, for example, counts among its members such luminaries as Robert Bern­
stein, formerly the top executive at Random House; Robert Joffe, the managing partner 
at Cravath, Swaine and Moore; Jack Greenberg, the former director-counsel at LDF and 
professor of law at Columbia University; and Alice Henkin, an important human rights 
advocate and spouse of the acclaimed professor of international law Louis Henkin. The 
board of directors of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights includes its chair, Nor­
man Dorsen, the prominent New York University law professor, former ACLU presi­
dent, and First Amendment expert; Louis Henkin; Sigourney Weaver, the actress; Kerry 
Kennedy Cuomo, the founder of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human 
Rights, named for her father; Marvin Frankel, formerly the chairman of the board and a 
named partner in a major New York City law firm; and Tom Bernstein, the committee's 
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president, a senior business executive, and son of Robert Bernstein. The board of direc­
tors of the International Human Rights Law Group is composed of similar personali­
ties. These boards are predominantly white and male and almost completely American; 
some, such as those of the Lawyers Committee or HRW, typically have one or several 
Mrican Americans or a member of another nonwhite minority. 
The boards of the European-based INGOs, the ICJ and AI, tend to differ, some­
what, from American INGOs, although they too are dominated by Westerners, Western­
trained academics, professionals, and policy makers, or non-Westerners whose world­
view is predominantly Western. Thus, even these Asians and Mricans-who, though 
nonwhite, nevertheless "think white" or "European" -champion, usually uncritically, 
the universalization of the human rights corpus and liberal democracy. In 1997, for ex­
ample, the seven members of the executive committee of the ICJ included a British 
lawyer, a Dutch law professor, a Peruvian (a Westerner), and four establishment figures 
from India, Ghana, Cape Verde, and Jordan. The non-Westerners in the group were 
prominent legal professionals steeped in either the common law or the civil law tra­
ditions. AI's International Executive Committee, its principal policy-making organ, is 
arguably more global looking-it includes a number of members from the South-al­
though it too has historically been dominated by Westerners .16 The staffs of all the major 
INGOs, including AI's headquarters in London, are similarly dominated by Western­
ers, although both AI and the ICJ now have Mrican headsP The selection of the boards 
and staffs of INGOs seems designed to guard against individuals, even if they are West­
erners, who may question the utility or appropriateness of the conventional doctrinalist 
approach. This vetting perpetuates their narrow mandates and contradicts the implied 
and stated norms of diversity and equality, the raison d'etre for the existence of these 
organizations.18 
The relationship between social, financial, and other material support provides 
further evidence of the political character of INGOs. Except for AI, which relies heavily 
on membership dues, most INGOs are funded by a combination of foundation grants, 
private donations, corporations, businesses, and governments. While most do not ac­
cept government funds, some, among them the ICJ and the International Human 
Rights Law Group, have accepted financial support from governmental sources such 
as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Canadian 
and Nordic counterparts.19 Those who reject government funds cite concerns for their 
independence of action and thought. It seems fair to conclude that to be considered 
for acceptance financial support must come from an industrial democracy with a com­
mitment to promoting human rights abroad; presumably, support from Saudi Arabia 
or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, clearly authoritarian states, would be unac­
ceptable. 
The value of the board of directors is critical for groups that rely on private fund­
ing. Those networks and associations signify an INGOs's reputation and acceptability 
by political and business elites. In the past decade, some INGOs, especially those based 
in the United States, have devised a fund-raising gimmick. At an annual dinner they 
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present an award to a noted activist from a repressive country in the South or to a West­
erner with superstar quality, such as Senator Edward Kennedy or George Soros, the 
philanthropist, and invite well-to-do, if not wealthy, citizens, corporations, law firms, 
and foundations to "buy a table," a euphemism by which it is meant an invitee purchases 
the right to the dinner by reserving a table for a certain number of guests for a substan­
tial donation. This tapestry of social and business ties, drawn from leading Americans 
who believe in liberal values and their internationalization through the human rights 
regime, underlines the agenda of INGOs. 2 0 
Mandates of INGOs 
Substantively, conventional doctrinalists stress a narrow range of civil and political 
rights, as is reflected by the mandates of leading INGOs like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. Throughout the Cold War period, INGOs concentrated their 
attention on the exposure of violations of what they deemed "core" rights in Soviet 
bloc countries, Mrica, Asia, and Latin America. In a reflection of this ideological bias, 
INGOs mirrored the position of the industrial democracies and generally assumed an 
unsympathetic and, at times, hostile posture towards calls for the expansion of their 
mandates to include economic and social rights. 2 1  
In the last few years since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, however, several INGOs 
have started to talk about the "indivisibility" of rights; a few now talk about their be­
lief in the equality of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
although their rhetoric has not been matched by action and practice. Many, in particu­
lar Human Rights Watch, for a long time remained hostile, however, to the recognition 
of economic and social rights as rights. HRW, which considered such rights violations 
"misfortunes," instead advanced its own nebulous interpretation of "indivisible human 
rights," which related civil and political rights to survival, subsistence, and poverty, "as­
sertions" of good that it did not explicitly call rights. 2 2  It argued that subsistence and 
survival are dependent on civil and political rights, especially those related to demo­
cratic accountability. 2 3  According to this view, civil and political rights belong to the 
first rank because the realization of other sets of concerns or rights, however they are 
termed, depend on them. 2  4 
In September 1996, however, Human Rights Watch abandoned its long-standing 
opposition to the advocacy of economic and social rights. 2 5  It passed a highly restrictive 
and qualified policy-effective January 1997 -to investigate, document, and promote 
compliance with the ICESCR. Under the terms of the new policy, HRW's work on the 
ICESCR will be limited to two situations: where protection of the ICESCR right is "nec­
essary to remedy a substantial violation of an ICCPR right," and where "the violation 
of an ICESCR right is the direct and immediate product of a substantial violation of an 
ICCPR right." Furthermore, HRW will intervene to protect ICESCR rights only where 
the violation is a "direct product of state action, whether by commission or omission" ; 
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where the "principle applied in articulating an ICESCR right is one of general appli­
cability " ;  and where "there is a clear, reasonable and practical remedy that HRW can 
advocate to address the ICESCR violation." 
While an important step by HRW, this policy statement can be seen as a continua­
tion of the history of skepticism toward economic and social rights HRW has long dem­
onstrated; it sees economic and social rights only as an appendage of civil and political 
rights. Its construction seems to condition ICESCR rights on ICCPR rights-in other 
words, economic and social rights do not exist outside the realm of civil and politi­
cal rights. Thus, one interpretation of the HRW policy could be that civil and political 
rights are the fundamental, primary rights without which other rights are less mean­
ingful and unattainable. The policy also continues HRW's stress on state-related vio­
lations, an orientation that does not place emphasis on important violators, such as 
businesses and international corporations. What is important about the policy, how­
ever, is the commitment by the largest and most influential American INGO to begin 
advocacy of economic and social rights. No other major INGO has gone that far in its 
practical work. Experimental for the first year, the policy now appears to be part of 
HRW's mandate, although it remains marginal to its work. 2 6  
Steiner has described the character of INGOs succinctly: 
The term "First World" NGOs both signifies an organization's geographical base and typifies cer­
tain kinds of mandates, functions, and ideological orientations. It describes such related charac­
teristics as a concentration on civil and political rights, a commitment to fair (due) process, an 
individualistic rather than group or community orientation in rights advocacy, and a belief in a 
pluralist society functioning within a framework of rules impartially applied to protect individu­
als against state interference. In a nutshell, "First World" NGOs means tlwse committed to trad itional 
Western liberal values associated with the origins of the human rights movement. Many of these NGOs 
work exclusively within their home countries, but the "First World" category also includes most 
of the powerful international NGOs that investigate events primarily in the Third World.27 
Traditionally, the work ofiNGOs has typically involved investigation,2 8 reporting,2 9 
and advocacy. 30 Investigation usually takes place in a Third World country, while re­
porting and advocacy aim at reforming policies of industrial democracies and inter­
governmental agencies to trigger bilateral and multilateral action against the repressive 
state. Some INGOs now go beyond this denunciatory framework and work to foster and 
strengthen processes and institutions-rule of law, laws and constitutions, judiciaries, 
legislatures, and electoral machineries-that ensure the protection of civil and politi­
cal rights. 31 Although the ideological commitment of these INGOs seems clear through 
their mandates and work, they nevertheless cast themselves as nonideological. For ex­
ample, Amnesty International refused to condemn apartheid as a political system or 
to adopt Nelson Mandela, the century's most prominent prisoner, as a prisoner of con­
science. They perceive themselves as politically neutral modern-day abolitionists whose 
only purpose is to identify "evil" and root it out. Steiner again notes that "although 
committed to civil-political rights and in this sense taking clear moral and political posi­
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tions, First World NGOs prefer to characterize themselves as above the play of partisan 
politics and political parties, and in this sense as apolitical. . . .  Their primary self-image 
is that of monitors, objective investigators applying the consensual norms of the human 
rights movement to the facts found. They are defenders of legality." 32 
Thus, although INGOs are "political" organizatioÕs that work to vindicate politi­
cal and moral principles that shape the basic characteristics of a state, they consciously 
present themselves as disinterested in the political character of a state. When HRW as­
serts that it "addresses the human rights practices of governments of all political stripes, 
of all geopolitical alignments, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions," it is anticipat­
ing charges that it is pro-Western, procapÖtalist, and unsympathetic to Islamic and other 
non-Western religious and political traditions. The first two charges could have been 
fatal to a group's credibility at the height of the Cold War. In reality, however, INGOs 
have been highly partial: their work has historically concentrated on those countries 
that have not attained the stable and functioning democracies of the West, the stan­
dard for liberal democracy. Target states have included the Soviet bloc and virtually the 
entire South, where undemocratic or repressive one-party states and military dictator­
ships have thrived. 
The content of the work ofiNGOs reveals their partiality as well. The typical INGO 
report is a catalogue of abuses committed by a government against liberal values. As 
Steiner notes, "given the ideological commitments of these NGOs, their investigative 
work naturally concentrates on matters such as governmental abuses of rights to per­
sonal security, discrimination, and basic political rights. By habit or established prac­
tice, NGOs' reports stress the nature and number of violations, rather than explore the 
socioeconomic and other factors that underlie them." 33 
Reports further document the abridgement of the freedoms of speech and asso­
ciation, violations of due process, and various forms of discrimination. Many INGOs 
fear that explaining why abuses occur may justify them or give credence to the claims of 
some governments that civil and political rights violations take place because of under­
development. Such an argument, if accepted, would destroy the abolitionists' mission 
by delaying, perhaps indefinitely, the urgency of complying with human rights stan­
dards. Abolitionists fear that this argument would allow governments ×o continue re­
pressive policies while escaping their obligations under human rights law. INGOs thus 
demand the immediate protection and respect of civil and political rights regardless 
of the level of development of the offending state. By taking cover behind the inter­
national human rights instruments, INGOs are able to fight for liberal values without 
appearing partisan, biased, or ideological. 
Law Versus Politics 
Conventional doctrinalists also perpetuate the appearance of objectivity by explicitly 
distinguishing themselves from agencies, communities, and government programs that 
promote democracy and democratization. The democracy and human rights commu­
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nities see themselves in different lights.3 The first is made up of individuals and in­
stitutions devoted to "democracy assistance programs" abroad, while the second is 
primarily composed of INGOs. The human rights community has created a law-versus­
politics dichotomy through which it presents itself as the guardian of international law, 
in this case human rights law, as opposed to the promoter of the more elusive con­
cept of democracy, which it sees as a political ideology.3 A complex web of reasons, 
motivations, and contradictions permeates this distinction. 
The seeds of the dichotomy are related to the attempt by the human rights com­
munity not to side with the two protagonists of the Cold War, and in particular Ronald 
Reagan's crusade against communism and his efforts to pave the way for democracy 
and free markets across the globe. The human rights community, whose activists and 
leaders are mostly Democrats or sympathetic to the Democratic Party, in the case of 
the United States, or Social Democrats and Labor Party sympathizers in Europe-lib­
erals or those to the left of center in Western political jargon-viewed with alarm Rea­
gan's and Margaret Thatcher's push for free markets and support for any pro-Western 
government, notwithstanding its human rights record. This hostility was exacerbated 
by the Reagan administration's attempts to reverse the rhetorical prominence that the 
Carter administration had given to human rights in American foreign policy. Although 
INGOs delighted in Reagan's opposition to communist rule within the Soviet bloc­
their own human rights reports on Soviet bloc countries were scathing-they sought 
"impartiality" and a "principled" use by the administration of human rights as a tool 
of foreign policy. INGOs also feared that "democracy programs" would focus only on 
elections without entrenching basic civil and political rights.36 In addition, INGOs be­
lieved that the focus on democracy blurred the focus on violators and dulled the clarity 
of physical violations of rights. 
The differentiation between democratic and free-market crusades and human 
rights had another advantage: Western governments and human rights groups could 
play "good cop, bad cop" roles in the spread of Western liberal values. While the West in 
bilateral agreements and projects opened up previously closed or repressive one-party 
societies to markets and "encouraged" democratization, human rights groups would 
be unrelenting in their assault on the same government for violating civil and political 
rights. Ordinarily, staffs of INGOs consulted extensively with the State Department or 
relevant foreign ministry, Western diplomats 3 in the "repressive" state, and elements 
of the United Nations charged with human rights oversight, such as the Commission 
on Human Rights, the Committee Against Torture, and the Human Rights Committee. 
Other factors indicate the commitment of INGOs to liberal democracy as a politi­
cal project. At least one American NGO, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, a domestic NGO with an INGO dimension, expressly linked the survival of its 
international operations to the "attainment" of democracy by, for example, shutting 
down its Southern Mrica Project after the 1994 South Mrican elections. Some INGO 
reports explicitly lament the failure of democratic reform.3 They defend and seek to 
immortalize prodemocracy activists in repressive states.39 At least one former leader of 
4 
5 
7 
8 
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an INGO recognizes that the distinction made between democracy and human rights 
is a facade: 
This determination to establish impartiality in the face of human rights violations under different 
political systems led Amnesty International to shun the rhetorical identification of human rights 
with democracy. But in fact the struggle against violations, committed mostly by undemocratic 
authoritarian governments, was closely bound up with the struggle for democracy. Thousands of 
prisoners of conscience for whom Amnesty International worked in its first three decades were 
political activists challenging the denial of their rights to freedom of expression and association.40 
Conclusion 
In the past decade, some INGOs have started seeking the deployment of the resources 
of other institutions, in addition to those of the United Nations, in their advocacy for 
liberal values. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, for example, has instituted a 
project that explores ways of encouraging international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank to build human rights concerns into their policies.4 1 Perhaps INGOs should 
openly acknowledge the inescapable and intrinsic linkage between human rights 
and democracy, a fact consciously recognized by quasi-governmental agencies in the 
North.4 2 
The facade of neutrality, the fiction that INGOs do not seek the establishment of 
a particular political system, in this case, a liberal democracy, must be abandoned im­
mediately. No one should be expected to believe that the scheme of rights promoted 
by INGOs does not seek to replicate a vision of society based on the industrial democ­
racies of the North. Only after openly conceding that INGOs indeed have a specific 
political agenda can discussions be had about the wisdom, problems, and implications 
for the advocacy of such values. And only then can conversations about the postliberal 
society start in earnest. 
Notes 
1. Initially founded in 1920 to advocate the rights of conscientious objectors, the ACLU sees 
itself as the "guardian of the Bill of Rights which guarantees fundamental civil liberties to all of 
us." These rights include the freedoms of speech, press, and religion (First Amendment); free­
dom from abuses by the police, domes* spying, and other illegal intelligence activities (Fourth 
Amendment); equal treatment and fair play (Fifth Amendment); fair trial (Sixth Amendment); 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth Amendment); and privacy and per­
sonal autonomy (Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments). See Laurie S. Wiseberg and Hazel 
Sirett, eds., North American Human Rights Directory (Garrett Park, Md.: Garrett Park Press, 1984) , 
p. 19. 
2 .  The NAACP, the oldest U.S. civil rights organization, was founded in 1909 to seek equal 
treatment-the removal of racial di · ination in areas such as voting, employment, housing, 
business, courts, and transportation-for ican Americans through peaceful reform. See ibid., 
p. 161. 
3. Although today the LDF and the 
:s:
P are separate legal entities, the LDF was founded in 
1939 as the legal arm of the NAACP. It has initiated legal action in courts to challenge discrimi­
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nation and promote equality in schools, jobs, the electoral system, land use, and other services 
and areas. Ibid., p. 159. 
4 .  See Wiseberg and Sirett, eds., North American Human Rights Directory, p. 135. 
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and Asia, particularly in South-West Mrica, now Namibia. See William Korey, NGOs and the Uni­
versal Declaration of Human Rights: ''l\ Curious Grapevine" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 101. 
6. See Rita McWilliams, "Who Watched Americas Watch?" National Interest 19 (1990), pp. 45, 
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partner in a New York law firm. Telephone interview with the ILHR, September 13, 1996. 
7. On the mandate of the LCHR, see Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Critique: Review 
of the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990 (New York: Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, 1991), back leaf. 
8, See Wiseberg and Sirett, eds., North American Human Rights Directory p. 133. The institute 
itself was established in 1965 and has devoted considerable resources to the promotion of the 
idea of human rights. Richard Lillich, its former president, is a professor of law at the University 
of Virginia School of Law and one of the leading writers on human rights. 
9. At a 1992 LDF symposium of public interest law NGOs from around the world, Julius Cham­
bers, then director-counsel of the LDF, recalled how Thurgood Marshall, his most celebrated 
predecessor, had in 1959 helped write the Kenya Constitution, and had helped to endow it with 
doctrines of due process, equality, and justice. Chambers also remembered how Jack Greenberg, 
another predecessor, had laid the groundwork for the Legal Resource Centre of South Mrica, 
one of that country's leading public interest law firms under apartheid. Instructively, he noted 
that he did not view the symposium "primarily as an occasion for the LDF to teachothers." See 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, Public Interest Law around the World: Report of a Symposium held at Columbia University in May 
1991 with Descriptions of Participating Legal Organizations from Twenty Countries (New York: Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, 1992), p. 1; emphasis added. Noting the progress made in establish­
ing human rights NGOs around the world and arguing for the removal of restrictions on NGOs to 
allow them to operate more freely, see also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The Establish­
ment of the Right of Non-Governmental Groups to operate (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, 1993). 
10. American INGOs argue, with some justification, that there is a glut of civil rights organiza­
tions addressing civil (human) rights problems in the United States. They therefore see little pur­
pose in duplicating the excellent work of local NGOs. This posture is self-defeating in several re­
spects. First, charges of "imperialism" undercut the effectiveness of American INGOs, even with 
some of their kindred spirits in the South and the former Soviet bloc. Secondly, domestic Ameri­
can NGOs remain unaware of the uses of the international rights regime and the solidarity of 
advocates elsewhere, facts which conspired to delay the ratification by the United States of major 
international human rights treaties. The absence of domestic U.S. NGOs from the international 
human rights movement served, among other things, to delegitimize the movement in the eyes 
of other cultures. Nevertheless, in a rare effort, Human Rights Watch and the ACLU in 1993 pro­
duced a report on human rights abuses in the United States. See Human Rights Watch and Ameri­
can Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Violations in the United States (New York: Human Rights 
Watch and American Civil Liberties Union, 1993).Two things were unusual about the effort: first, 
that an American INGO produced a human rights report on the United States, and second, that it 
did so in collaboration with a domestic American NGO. In a rare call, Dorothy Thomas, formerly 
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